Investigator and institutional financial conflicts of interest have raised concerns about both the integrity of clinical research and protecting the rights and welfare of research participants. In response, professional groups and governmental bodies have issued guidance for managing conflicts of interest to minimize their potential untoward effects. Although a variety of approaches have been offered, a common protection is to disclose financial interests in research to potential research participants as part of the recruitment and informed consent process. This approach reinforces (...) a basic norm of candor, ideally allowing potential research participants to evaluate whether financial interests should affect their decision to participate in research. Disclosure to potential research participants is viewed as an alternative to having regulators or research institutions limit or prohibit all financial interests in research, assuming that not all such interests are unacceptable. (shrink)

Strategies for disclosing investigators' financial interests to potential research participants have been adopted by many research institutions. However, little is known about how decisions are made regarding disclosures of financial interests to potential research participants, including what is disclosed and the rationale for making these determinations. We sought to understand the attitudes, beliefs, and practices of institutional review board chairs, conflict of interest committee chairs, and investigators regarding disclosure of financial interests to potential research participants. Several themes emerged, including general (...) attitudes toward conflicts of interest, circumstances in which financial interests should be disclosed, rationales and benefits of disclosure, what should be disclosed, negative effects of and barriers to disclosure, and timing and presentation of disclosure. Respondents cited several rationales for disclosure, including enabling informed decision making, promoting trust in researchers and research institutions, and reducing legal liability. There was general agreement that disclosure should happen early in the consent process. Respondents disagreed about whether to disclose the amounts of particular financial interests. Clarifying the goals of disclosure and understanding how potential research participants use the information will be critical in efforts to ensure the integrity of clinical research and to protect the rights and interests of participants. (shrink)

Let n ≥ 3 be an integer. We show that it is consistent that every σ1n-set of reals is universally Baire yet there is a projective well-ordering of the reals. The proof uses “David’s trick” in the presence of inner models with strong cardinals.

We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about the ontology or scenario underlying the belief change process. This is something that has been missing in previous work, with its focus on postulates. Our analysis shows that we must pay particular attention to two issues that have often been taken for granted: the (...) first is how we model the agent's epistemic state. (Do we use a set of beliefs, or a richer structure, such as an ordering on worlds? And if we use a set of beliefs, in what language are these beliefs are expressed?) We show that even postulates that have been called beyond controversy are unreasonable when the agent's beliefs include beliefs about her own epistemic state as well as the external world. The second is the status of observations. (Are observations known to be true, or just believed? In the latter case, how firm is the belief?) Issues regarding the status of observations arise particularly when we consider iterated belief revision, and we must confront the possibility of revising by and then by ¬. (shrink)

As part of a larger research study, we present model language for disclosing financial interests in clinical research to potential research participants, and we describe the empirical basis and theoretical assumptions used in developing the language. The empirical process for creating appropriate disclosure language resulted in a generic disclosure statement for cases in which no risk to participants’ welfare or the scientific integrity of the research is expected, and nine more specific disclosure statements for cases in which some risk is (...) expected. The disclosure statements are not meant to be canonical, but were instead designed to reflect the typical situations in which disclosure of financial interest might be considered by an institutional review board or conflict of interest committee. Individual institutions could modify key phrases to suit their purposes, and others could use the language in future empirical work on informed consent to better refine the options for disclosing financial interests in clinical research. (shrink)

The use of x[y,z,w] rather than the more usual y Πx has many advantages for this work. One of them is that we have found a convenient way to eliminate any need for axiom schemes. All axioms considered are single sentences with clear meaning. (In one case only, the axiom is a conjunction of a manageable finite number of sentences).

The considerable attention to financial interests in clinical research has focused mostly on academic medical centers, even though the majority of clinical research is conducted in community practice settings. To fill this gap, this article maps the practices and policies in 73 community hospitals and several hundred specialized facilities around the country for reviewing clinical investigators’ financial relationships with research sponsors. Community hospitals face a substantially different mix of issues than academic medical centers do because their physician researchers are usually (...) not employees, and more of their studies are later-phase, multicenter trials. Accordingly, community physicians stand to benefit personally from per capita payments, but they tend to have less direct influence over research findings when compared with their academic peers. These and other contrasts require separate guidance for community-based organizations that takes into account their particular needs, circumstances, and institutional capacities. (shrink)

Dans le cadre des négociations commerciales internationales, les politiques en faveur de la diversité culturelle désignent un objectif qui consiste à limiter l'uniformisation censée résulter du fonctionnement du marché et du libre-échange. Depuis quelques années, le véritable débat ne porte plus sur l'objectif lui-même qui semble faire l'objet d'un consensus, mais sur les moyens d'y parvenir. Notre propos dans cet article est justement de revenir sur cet objectif en montrant sa complexité et son caractère multidimensionnel. Au-delà du discours incantatoire à (...) portée très générale sur ses bienfaits supposés, les décideurs publics doivent donc effectuer des arbitrages, classiquement en termes de coûts/bénéfices, de manière plus complexe entre les différentes dimensions de la diversité. Mener une politique en faveur de la diversité culturelle suppose donc de faire des choix parmi ces multiples aspects et d'assumer les coûts induits. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Dans le plan de la première partie de la Somme Théologique de Thomas d’Aquin, les questions 12 et 13, dédiées aux noms divins, occupent une place privilégiée et confèrent une perspective inédite au discours théologique grâce à leur double fonction. D’une part, leur fonction est normale dans l’ordre du discours : après avoir établi les principaux attributs de Dieu, dont on a justement affirmé dans la 2e question qu’il est, les deux questions fixent les limites dans lesquelles il peut être (...) connu. D’autre part, les deux questions jouent le rôle de clivage dans l’ordre du discours qui établit comment est Dieu. Ainsi les deux interrogations fondent la connaissance de l’intellect humain par rapport à l’objet véritablement transcendant à toute expérience et questionnent, par conséquent, les conditions de possibilité de la connaissance intellectuelle générique de Dieu sur l’objet. Ce dernier aspect se réfléchit y compris chez les tenants de cette connaissance de telle façon que la légitimation des noms divins ait le rôle d’une légitimation de la théologie comme science, dont l’existence était annoncée et débattue au début de la Somme. (shrink)

Est-ce un ouvrage historique? Est-ce un roman? Un roman historique? Le lecteur est désemparé dès qu’il plonge dans l’ouvrage que Gisèle Halimi a consacré à la grande héroïne judéo berbère. Si l’on comprend bien l’intérêt de l’avocate féministe – par ailleurs juive et née en Tunisie – pour cette figure féminine de résistance, la gêne s’installe au fur et à mesure de la lecture, face à l’impossibilité de l’auteur de choisir un genre littéraire et de s’y tenir. Alors que le (...) destin légendaire... (shrink)

La connaissance de soi suppose que l'on puisse former des pensées vraies de la forme 'je Y que P', où 'Y' fait référence à une attitude propositionnelle, 'P' à son contenu, et 'je' au penseur de cette pensée. La question qui se pose est de savoir, ce qui, dans le contenu mental occurrent [P], justifie l'auto-attribution de cette pensée. Ce problème dit de la transition soulève trois difficultés ; celle de la préservation du contenu intentionnel entre la pensée de premier (...) et de second ordre ; celle de la reconnaissance de l'attitude ayant ce contenu intentionnel pour objet, et enfin la reconnaissance que ce qui est pensé l'est par le sujet qui pense. Le présent article se propose de montrer que la troisième difficulté résiste à une approche fondée sur l'expérience ou sur la signification cognitive de [P], et avance l'idée que la notion d'action mentale permet d'éclairer les conditions d'identité du penseur de [P] et du sujet de l'auto-attribution de l'attitude propositionnelle 'Y que P'.Self-knowledge requires the capacity to think true thoughts of the form 'I Y that P', where 'Y' refers to a propositional attitude, 'P' to a propositional content, and 'I' to the thinker of the thought of content P. The question that this requirement raises is to know what, in the occurrent mental content [P] , justifies the self-attribution of this thought. This problem, called the transition problem, includes three difficulties : how is intentional content stable across first- and second-order thoughts ? How is the attitude with this intentional content identified by the thinker ? And how is the thinker of the second-order thought able to claim truly that he himself is the thinker of the first-order thought ? The present paper's aim is to show that the third difficulty cannot be solved through an examination of the experience of having [P] or on the basis of the cognitive significance of P, and suggests that an analysis of mental actions in which propositional attitudes play a causal and feedback role give a better grasp on the conditions of identity of the thinker of [P] with the thinker of the propositional attitude 'Y that P'. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should (...) be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y Authors Jane Friedman, St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UJ UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In (...) the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship between the constitutive function of a priori principles and entrenchment. (shrink)

Quelle différence y a-t-il entre des règles de droit et des ordres appuyés de menaces? Qu'est-ce qu'une obligation juridique et en quoi se trouve-t-elle apparentée à une obligation morale? Quelle est la nature des règles et dans quelle mesure le droit consiste-t-il en des règles? Qu'est-ce que la justice et en quoi diffère-t-elle du reste de la morale?Au cours d'une discussion approfondie et séparée de ces problèmes récurrents, l'auteur relève une série d'éléments d'une importance essentielle pour la compréhension du droit, (...) et réalise un nouveau départ dans la théorie du droit. L'ouvrage comporte une nouvelle analyse des notions de validité juridique, de souveraineté, et de fondement d'un système juridique, un nouvel examen du droit naturel et du positivisme juridique, une discussion originale des limites du formalisme dans l'élaboration de la décision judiciaire, et un examen de la nature du droit international.Le texte est complété par des notes bibliographiques détaillées et la discussion de thèses émises par des auteurs contemporains et plus anciens. Cette deuxième édition s'accompagne en outre d'une postface posthume, publiée sous la responsabilité de P.A. Bulloch et J. Raz. (shrink)

We now fix A ⊆ Q. We study a fundamental class of digraphs associated with A, which we call the A-digraphs. An A,kdigraph is a digraph (Ak,E), where E is an order invariant subset of A2k in the following sense. For all x,y ∈ A2k, if x,y have the same order type then x ∈ E ↔ y ∈ E.

Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as opposed rather than complementary. In (...) particular, I argue that a consideration of the fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical projects of Carnap (logic of science) and Kuhn (providing a theory of scientific revolutions)renders the alleged similarities between their views superficial in comparison to their fundamental differences. In defense of the received view, I suggest that Carnap and Kuhn are model representatives of two contrasting styles of doing philosophy of science, viz., logical analysis and historical analysis respectively. This analysis clarifies the role played by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the twentieth-century. (shrink)

An ideal in a commutative ring R with unit is a nonempty I Õ R such that for all x,y Œ I, z Œ R, we have x+y and xz Œ I. A set of generators for I is a subset of I such that I is the least ideal containing that subset.

Let R Õ [1,n]3k ¥ [1,n]k. We define R = {y Œ [1,n]k:($xŒA3)(R(x,y))}. We say that R is strictly dominating if and only if for all x,yŒ[1,n]k, if R(x,y) then max(x) < max(y).

We say that R is strictly dominating if and only if for all x,yŒ[1,n], if R(x,y) then max(x) 3k ¥ [1,n], there exists A Õ [1,n] such that R = A. Furthermore, A Õ [1,n] is unique.

El poeta andalusí Ibrāhīm ibn Sahl (609/1212-649/1251), que se convirtió del judaísmo al islam, escribió poemas pertenecientes al subgénero de la poesía amorosa conocida como al-ġazal al-ʿuḏrī sobre los amados Moisés, y con menor frecuencia Mahoma. Las investigaciones sobre Ibn Sahl se han centrado, tradicionalmente, en la cuestión acerca de si la conversión histórica al islam fue sincera o si sus poemas sobre Moisés reflejan un anhelo oculto por el judaísmo. Este artículo problematiza esta cuestión, prestando atención a lo que (...) se sabe de las circunstancias históricas en las que vivió Ibn Sahl y por medio de una discusión crítica del fenómeno de la conversión. Luego redirijo la conversación sobre la poesía de Ibn Sahl: en lugar de tratar de comprender la sinceridad de la conversión de Ibn Sahl a través de su poesía este artículo lee sus poemas como textos literarios, con atención a sus juegos de palabras, imágenes e intertextualidad. El análisis de la poesía de Ibn Sahl, que presta mucha atención a esta significativa intertextualidad, ilumina la red de referencias religiosas que hay en ella y las formas en las que funcionan dentro de la poesía. La conclusión, tras la lectura atenta de poemas seleccionados del dīwān de Ibn Sahl, es que el mérito de estos poemas y las características que los han hecho atractivos para el público proceden de las formas en que mantienen la posibilidad de diferentes interpretaciones, por lo que continuamente avivan la curiosidad del público, así como su uso, que induce a los portentos del lenguaje figurativo, la intertextualidad y los juegos de palabras. (shrink)

This paper concerns the recent debate on the nature and motivations of the epistemological project advanced in Rudolf Carnap's (1891-1970) Aufbau. Much of this debate has been initiated by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson who argue (against the received view of the Aufbau as a foundationalist defense of empiricism) that Carnap's epistemological project is located in the tradition of neo-Kantian epistemology. On this revisionist reading of the Aufbau, Carnap's project is not motivated to address traditional empiricist problems regarding the (...) justification of knowledge, but rather to show how objective knowledge is possible. A central aspect of the Aufbau that is neglected in the revisionists' analysis is the role of epistemic justification in Carnap's project. The aim of the present study is to argue that although the general epistemology in the Aufbau can be cast as neo-Kantian, Carnap's method of construction theory (or rational reconstruction) is formulated precisely as an empiricist method for the justification of conceptual knowledge. Construction theory radically redefines `empirical justification' into a formal-conventional notion, and is part of Carnap's more general agenda of redefining epistemology as a purely formal discipline. (shrink)

In this paper we will show that Hempel's covering law model can't deal very well with explanations that are based on incomplete knowledge. In particular the symmetry thesis, which is an important aspect of the covering law model, turns out to be problematic for these explanations. We will discuss an example of an electric circuit, which clearly indicates that the symmetry of explanation and prediction does not always hold. It will be argued that an alternative logic for causal explanation is (...) needed. And we will investigate to what extent non-monotonic epistemic logic can provide such an alternative logical framework. Finally we will show that our non-monotonic logical analysis of explanation is not only suitable for simple cases such as the electric circuit, but that it also sheds new light on more controversial causal explanations such as Milton Friedman's explanation of the business cycle. (shrink)

Michael Friedman’s Dynamics of Reason is a welcome contribution to the ongoing articulation of philosophical perspectives for understanding the sciences in the context of post-positivist philosophy of science. Two perspectives that have gained advocacy since the demise of the “received view” are Quinean naturalism and Kuhnian relativism. In his 1999 Stanford lectures, Friedman articulates and defends a neo-Kantian perspective for philosophy of science that opposes both of these perspectives. His proffered neo-Kantian perspective is presented within the context of (...) the problem of theory change or “scientific revolutions,” and its main feature is a conception of scientific knowledge that requires “relativized constitutive a priori principles.” The lectures make up the first part of the book; the second part of the book, “Fruits of Discussion,” is a further elaboration and defence of the ideas advanced in the lectures. The resulting book serves as a useful sequel to Friedman’s impressive historical studies in Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Kant and the Exact Sciences, and Reconsidering Logical Positivism. In the preface, Friedman tells us that this book represents the philosophical viewpoint that he has arrived at as a result of completing these works. As such, it is not surprising that the prominent themes of the book are ones that have occupied Friedman’s attention in the past, viz., the importance of a priori principles in the exact sciences, the conventionalism of the logical positivists, and, more generally, an articulation of what remains defensible in neo-Kantian philosophy of science. (shrink)

Las interpretaciones contemporáneas en torno a lo a priori en la filosofía de la ciencia han estado dominadas fundamentalmente por las concepciones semántica y pragmática. El aporte de estas concepciones ha sido significativo, pero han rechazado injustificadamente, a mi modo de ver, el sentido funda..

The contemporary interpretations on the a priori in the philosophy of science have been dominated mainly by a semantic and a pragmatic reading. Although the contribution of these conceptions has been valuable, it is my point of view that they have rejected without justification the fundamental meaning of the original Kantian notion, that is, the idea of the constitution of the experience. In this paper I intend to do two things: first, after a presentation of the argument between Friedman (...) and Richardson, both supporters of the semantic and pragmatic readings, I will show the historical reasons that one can use to reject the semantic interpretation of the a priori. Then, I will sketch a conception of the constitutive a priori which, tracking the proposals of philosophers of the 19th century, will insist on the idea that the experience is dominated by a formal function which consists in the production of “invariants”. (shrink)

According to Michael Friedman’s theory of explanation, a law X explains laws Y1, Y2, …, Yn precisely when X unifies the Y’s, where unification is understood in terms of reducing the number of independently acceptable laws. Philip Kitcher criticized Friedman’s theory but did not analyze the concept of independent acceptability. Here we show that Kitcher’s objection can be met by modifying an element in Friedman’s account. In addition, we argue that there are serious objections to the use (...) that Friedman makes of the concept of independent acceptability. (shrink)

An area in the theory of action that has received little attention is how mental agency and world-directed agency interact. The purpose of the present contribution is to clarify the rational conditions of such interaction, through an analysis of the central case of acceptance. There are several problems with the literature about acceptance. First, it remains unclear how a context of acceptance is to be construed. Second, the possibility of conjoining, in acceptance, an epistemic component, which is essentially mind-to-world, and (...) a utility component, which requires a world-to-mind direction of fit, is merely posited rather than derived from the rational structure of acceptance. Finally, the norm of acceptance is generally seen as related to truth, which turns out to be inapplicable in a number of cases. We will argue, first, that the specific context-dependence of acceptances is derived from their being mental actions, each embedded in a complex hierarchy of acceptances composing, together, a planning sequence. Second, that acceptances come in several varieties, corresponding to the specific epistemic norm(s) that constitute them. The selection of a particular norm for accepting answers to considerations of utility – to the association of an epistemic goal with an encompassing world-directed action. Once a type of acceptance is selected, however, the epistemic norm constitutive for that acceptance strictly applies. Third, we argue that context-dependence superimposes a decision criterion on the output of the initial epistemic acceptance. Strategic acceptance is regulated by instrumental norms of expected utility, which may rationally lead an agent to screen off her initial epistemic acceptance. (shrink)

Women have historically been prevented from living autonomously by systematic injustice, subordination, and oppression. The lingering effects of these practices have prompted many feminists to view autonomy with suspicion. Here, Marilyn Friedman defends the ideal of feminist autonomy. In her eyes, behavior is autonomous if it accords with the wants, cares, values, or commitments that the actor has reaffirmed and is able to sustain in the face of opposition. By her account, autonomy is socially grounded yet also individualizing and (...) sometimes socially disruptive, qualities that can be ultimately advantageous for women. Friedman applies the concept of autonomy to domains of special interest to women. She defends the importance of autonomy in romantic love, considers how social institutions should respond to women who choose to remain in abusive relationships, and argues that liberal societies should tolerate minority cultural practices that violate women's rights so long as the women in question have chosen autonomously to live according to those practices. (shrink)

Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...) to satisfy the trade-off above when achieving goals of each type. While actions of the first two types depend on non-conceptual appraisals of a given intensity and valence, strategic intentions have a propositional format and guide action within longer-term executive frameworks involving prospective memory. (shrink)

In this new book, Michael Friedman argues that Kant's continuing efforts to find a metaphysics that could provide a foundation for the sciences is of the utmost ...

This Book Incorporates Prof. Friedman S Lectures And Discussions That Were A Part Of The Inter-Cultural Dialogue At Many Levels. His Major Contribution Is In Developing An Approach That Is Within The Framework Of The Human Image.